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LETTING FRUSTRATIONS GET THE
BETTER OF US-SECOND CIRCUIT
ALLOWS A LESSEE/SUBLESSOR TO
ESCAPE CERCLA LIABILITY-
COMMANDER OIL CORP. v. BARLO
EQUIPMENT CORP., 215 F.3d 321
(2d CIR. 2000)
Neil R. Burger*
HE Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
1 Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) a imposes strict liability on a wide
range of persons and entities that are sufficiently related to con-
taminated land. 2 Although the statute specifically names those who are
subject to strict liability for cleanup costs, courts have struggled with
CERCLA's ambiguities and inconsistencies. 3 In Commander Oil Corp. v.
* B.A., 1998, Emory University; Candidate for J.D., 2002, Southern Methodist Uni-
versity School of Law.
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1994).
2. Liability is imposed on four classes of potentially responsible parties (PRPs):
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned
or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for the
disposal or treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for dispo-
sal or treatment, of hazardous substances owned or possessed by such per-
son, by any other party or entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned
or operated by another party or entity and containing such hazardous sub-
stances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for trans-
port to disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected
by such person, from which there is such release, or a threatened release
which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a hazardous substance.
Id. § 9607(a).
3. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475 U.S. 355, 363 (1986); Atd. Richfield Co. v. Am.
Airlines, Inc., 98 F.3d 564, 570-71 (10th Cir. 1995); Hanford Downwinders Coalition, Inc. v.
Dowdle, 71 F.3d 1469, 1480 (9th Cir. 1995); see also WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., 4 ENVI-
RONMENTAL LAW: HAZARDOUS WASTES AND SUBSTANCES § 8.3(c)(1), at 514 (1992)
("Vagueness, contradiction, and dissembling are familiar features of the environmental
statutes, but CERCLA is secure in its reputation as the worst drafted of the lot."). It
should be of no surprise that courts have encountered problems interpreting CERCLA.
The lame-duck Ninety-Sixth Congress hurried the Act through the legislature to beat the
arrival of President-elect Reagan and the Republican Senate in December 1980. See Frank
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Barlo Equipment Corp. ,4 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals became
frustrated with CERCLA's imprecise definitions and ruled that a lessee/
sublessor with site control over contaminated land was not liable for con-
tribution to the cost of cleanup. 5 The court analyzed Barlo's potential
liability as an "owner" and as an "operator."'6 After discussing the ratio-
nales for imposing CERCLA liability, the court determined as a matter
of law that, while in certain circumstances holding a lessee/sublessor lia-
ble would be correct, such a harsh penalty was not appropriate in this
instance. 7 Although correctly ruling that not all lessees should be held
strictly liable, the court should not have reversed the district court's rul-
ing that Barlo fell within the definition of "owner." The court improperly
allowed equity principles and its own frustrations with CERCLA's draft-
ing to cloud its judgement.
Commander Oil became the owner of record of the disputed land in
Uniondale, New York, in 1963. The land was divided into two plots, 7A
and 7B. In 1964, Barlo leased the land and warehouse facilities on lot 7A
from Commander Oil. Lot 7B, the contaminated land at issue in this
case, was leased to Pasley Solvents & Chemicals, Inc. ("Pasley"). 8 In
1972, Commander Oil consolidated the two separate leases into one lease
and one sublease. Under the terms of the new contract, Barlo held the
entire property and subleased lot 7B to Pasley. With the new contract,
Barlo became responsible for paying the taxes on all the property and
performing the maintenance on the facilities. For the added burden,
Barlo made a slight profit from the sublease to Pasley.9
In 1981, the Nassau County Department of Health discovered contami-
nation caused by above-ground petroleum and solvent storage tanks on
lot 7B. 10 After an investigation by the Environmental Protection
Agency, Commander Oil was forced to reimburse the government for
response costs associated with the cleanup.1' A settlement deal, totaling
almost two million dollars, among several liable parties was ultimately
reached in 1996.12
Commander Oil filed a CERCLA action for contribution and contrac-
tual indemnification against Barlo and Pasley in 1990.13 Also in the com-
P. Grad, A History of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Lia-
bility ("Superfund") Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. Er'vTL. L. 1, 1-2 (1982).
4. 215 F.3d 321 (2d Cir. 2000).
5. Id. at 324.
6. Id. at 327-30; see also 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (defining the term "owner or
operator").
7. Comander Oil, 215 F.3d at 324.
8. Id. Pasley did not factor into the allocation of liability and contribution. It was
deemed financially unable to pay by the district court. Id. at 325.
9. Id. at 324-25. Barlo contested the fact that it had any added responsibility under
the consolidated lease. Id.
10. See id.
11. Id. at 325.
12. Id. Barlo was not part of this settlement agreement.
13. See id. Pasley was not required to contribute. See supra text accompanying note
[Vol. 54
CASENOTE
plaint, Commander Oil pleaded for damages under state laws for
trespass, negligence, nuisance, and waste. 14
In granting partial summary judgement for both Commander Oil and
Barlo, the district court held that Barlo was an "owner" within the defini-
tion of CERCLA section 9607(a)(1). 15 Under the meaning of that sec-
tion, the district court reasoned, an entity that has "authority and
control" of a contaminated plot of land is an "owner" for CERCLA pur-
poses. 16 The court implicitly found that the actual responsibilities of
Barlo under the consolidated lease equated the lessee/sublessor (Barlo)
with an "owner" and justified imposing strict liability.17 After Barlo was
determined to be legally liable for contribution, a bench trial was held,
and Barlo was allocated 25% of the cleanup costs. Barlo appealed, argu-
ing that only the recorded owner of a parcel of land is an "owner" under
the meaning of CERCLA.' 8
Writing for the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, Judge Walker re-
versed the district court's holding that Barlo was liable for contribution as
an "owner" under CERCLA. 19 Judge Walker began the opinion by la-
menting that the court was faced with another interpretation problem
with an environmental statute.20 The court was unsure whether the term
"owner" or "operator" applied to Barlo. In the end, it found that neither
fit. 21 Under the court's reasoning, a lessee/sublessor could be liable as an
"owner" in some circumstances, but imposing strict liability on Barlo was
not appropriate. Barlo did hold some of the responsibilities of an owner,
but too many were reserved for Commander Oil for the harsh penalty of
CERCLA liability to attach.22
The court began by recognizing that most courts confronted with the
issue of whether ownership liability should be imposed on a lessee have
concluded that site control is a sufficient indicator of adequate responsi-
bility.23 Judge Walker gleaned from those opinions that liability under
CERCLA is meant for a lessee that "is the active user and polluter of the
property." 24 For that group of lessees "CERCLA liability seems particu-
larly appropriate." 25 The court concluded that those other courts had
14. See Commander Oil, 215 F.3d at 325. These additional claims were dismissed by




18. Id. at 325-27.
19. Id. at 324. Judges Cabranes and Katzmann also served on the panel.
20. Commander Oil, 215 F.3d at 326. Judge Walker displayed his frustration with the
drafting of CERCLA throughout the opinion. See id. at 327.
21. Id. at 327, 332.
22. Id. at 328, 332.
23. Id. at 328; see Castlerock Estates, Inc. v. Markham, 871 F. Supp. 360, 367 (N.D.
Cal. 1994); Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods Indus., Inc., 815 F. Supp. 1384, 1391-92 (E.D.
Wash. 1993); Pape v. Great Lakes Chem. Co., No. 93C1585, 1993 WL 424249, at *3 (N.D.
Ill. Oct. 19, 1993).




dangerously interwoven the concepts of "owner" and "operator." A
broad definition of "owner" would make the group of people liable as
"operators" too small. Basing its reasoning on the principle of avoiding
redundancy in statutes, the court found the lower court in error as a mat-
ter of law. 26
According to the appellate court, there would be situations in which a
lessee could be held liable as an "owner."'27 Since CERCLA involves
strict liability, the principles of Rylands v. Fletcher are central to its impo-
sition.28 The court correctly stated its rule that behind the "theory of
strict liability is the underlying fairness of imposing on the beneficiaries of
an ultra-hazardous activity the ultimate costs of that activity."' 29 Looking
at the facts determined by the lower court regarding Barlo's involvement
with plot 7B, the court determined that "Barlo lacked most of the bundle
of rights that comes with ownership of property. 30
Although CERCLA is a poorly drawn statute, it clearly places liability
for contaminated land on a lessee that exerts sufficient control and re-
sponsibility.31 The factors the court listed for determining when a lessee/
sublessor would be liable as an "owner" are specifically worded to the
facts of the case. They are not general factors to guide a future court's
analysis. 32 By looking at the underlying general principles of the five fac-
tors, Barlo should be held liable. It is irrelevant whether Barlo had the
right to sublease the property without notification, because in the instant
case, there was a contract that makes Barlo the sublessor. With that con-
tract, Barlo bound itself to the risks of land control. The facts were dis-
puted, but the district court concluded that Barlo had the responsibilities
associated with ownership-specifically, the payment of taxes and main-
tenance obligations. The district court was in a better position to deter-
mine the amount of control Barlo had over lot 7B. The appeals court
wrongly substituted its interpretation, under the guise of statutory
confusion.
The court's reliance on Rylands v. Fletcher further supports the imposi-
tion of strict liability on Barlo. In determining that Barlo was an "owner"
for CERCLA purposes, the lower court considered the fact that Barlo
26. Id. at 328-29.
27. Id. at 330-31. The court listed five factors that a court needs to consider before
imposing ownership liability on a lessee: (1) the length of the lease; (2) the termination
rights of the lease; (3) whether the lessee has the right to sublet without permission; (4)
whether the lessee is responsible for payments, such as insurance, taxes, and operation
costs; and (5) whether the lessee is responsible for structural repairs. See id.
28. Id. at 330 (citing Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868)).
29. Id. at 330.
30. Commander Oil, 215 F.3d at 332.
31. See, e.g., Servco Pac. Inc. v. Dods, 106 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1046 (D. Haw. 2000)
(finding a lessee liable under CERCLA as a matter of law); Long Beach Unified Sch. Dist.
v. Godwin, 32 F.3d 1364, 1367 (9th Cir. 1994) (stating that an easement holder could be
liable as an "operator"); Hanford Downwinders Coalition, Inc. v. Dowdle, 71 F.3d 1469,
1484 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that imposing liability is correct, even though the result may
seem harsh).
32. See supra note 27 (listing the five factors of the court).
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received a profit from the sublease of plot 7B. Although this point was
contested, it was inappropriate for the appeals court to ignore the finding.
Since Barlo benefited from the sublease, under Rylands v. Fletcher, it
should bear the risks associated with hazardous activity.33
CERCLA is based on the need to hold the people and entities associ-
ated with the land responsible for contamination in order to ensure that
the taxpayers do not have to pay.34 It is not an equity statute. The Sec-
ond Circuit Court of Appeals wrongly injected principles of fairness into
the equation. CERCLA imposes bright line liability that does not re-
quire a legal balancing test. The court's determination that strict liability
was not appropriate for Bar1o 35 went beyond the bounds of its judicial
review.36 The person that was closest to the facts, the district judge,
found that Barlo had sufficient authority over the land. The circuit's re-
versal of that fact, based on fairness, is unwarranted. In the CERCLA
context, equity may be used to apportion liability among liable parties,
rather than to determine which parties are liable.37
In another attempt to justify its conclusion, the court found it inappro-
priate to add the risk of CERCLA liability to parties operating under a
lease.38 But when a party enters into a contract, it becomes attached to
risk. Barlo knowingly entered into the consolidated lease agreement with
Commander Oil. The court failed to acknowledge this fact. In doing so,
it cited the need for expectation of liability. The liability imposed by
CERCLA has always engulfed parties that had no expectation of its
reach. Barlo should not be excluded with the excuse that it subleased
contaminated land before it was wrong to do so.
33. See United States v. S.C. Recycling and Disposal, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984, 1003
(D.S.C. 1984) ("As a general rule, a lessor or sublessor who allows property under his
control to be used by another in a manner which endangers third parties or which creates a
nuisance, is, along with the lessee or sublessee, liable for the harm."), affd in part, vacated
in part sub nom, United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988).
34. See Bell Petroleum Serv., Inc. v. Sequa Corp., 3 F.3d 889, 897 (5th Cir. 1993)
("CERCLA is a strict liability statute, one of the purposes of which is to shift the cost of
cleaning up environmental harm from the taxpayers to the parties who benefited from the
disposal of the wastes that caused the harm.").
35. Commander Oil, 215 F.3d at 332.
36. The issue of whether a lessee/sublessor could be liable as an "owner" under CER-
CLA was a case of first impression before the court, so the circuit court reviewed the
question under a de novo standard. Id. at 326. This standard is appropriate for review of
the law, but not the facts. Ultimately the Second Circuit came to the same legal conclusion
as that of the trial court: that a lessee/sublessor could be held liable as an "owner." The
difference in the outcome of the case came from the appellate court's reversal of the dis-
trict's factual determinations. Factual determinations should be reviewed for abuse of dis-
cretion, rather than de novo. See Martin B. Louis, Allocating Adjudicative Decision
Making Authority Between the Trial and Appellate Levels: A Unified View of the Scope of
Review, the Judge/Jury Question, and Procedural Discretion, 64 N.C. L. REV. 993, 994-995,
1000-04 (1986).
37. See Bell Petroleum Serv., 3 F.3d at 901.
38. Commander Oil, 215 F.3d at 330 ("We are reluctant to surprise Barlo with new and
unexpected liability, and to undermine the security of lessees/sublessors throughout the
circuit who have entered into subleases before this decision.").
2001]
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CERCLA might be a poorly drafted statute, but its underlying princi-
ples of liability are straightforward. As a remedial statute, it is to be con-
strued liberally in order to achieve its goals.39 It is reasonable to be
frustrated over the inconsistent and ambiguous terms and definitions.
For Congress's goal of imposing strict liability on owners and operators of
hazardous facilities40 to be realized, courts must apply the underlying
principles of CERCLA liability. Congress intended to hold entities in
Barlo's situation liable for the environmental harm committed on their
land. Barlo made money off the land, so Barlo should have to deal with
the consequences. By allowing its own frustrations to get the better of it,
the Second Circuit let a polluter slip through the cracks of statutory inter-
pretation. No doubt more will follow.
39. See id. at 327.
40. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1).
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